In many two-sided markets we observe that there is a common distributor on one side of the market. One example is the TV industry, where TV channels choose advertising prices to maximize own pro…t and typically delegate determination of viewer prices to independent distributors. We show that in such a market structure the stronger the competition between the TV channels, the greater will joint pro…ts in the TV industry be. We also show that joint pro…ts might be higher if the wholesale contract between each TV channel and the distributor consists of a simple …xed fee rather than a two-part tari¤.
Introduction
The most widespread business model in the TV industry is that the TV channels use a common distributor to reach the viewers. The TV channels set advertising prices on their own, but delegate to the distributor to determine the prices that the viewers have to pay. This delegation has the bene…t that there will be no price competition between the TV channels in the viewer market; any business-stealing e¤ects will be internalized by the distributor. In a traditional ("one-sided") market, such inter-…rm price coordination would always be bene…cial to the …rms. Other things equal, it would generate the same joint pro…t as would be obtainable in a perfect cartel. We show that this logic does not apply in a two-sided market such as the TV industry. 1 To understand this, note that the distributor does not fully internalize the impact that high viewer prices have on revenues from the advertising side of the market.
Likewise, the TV stations, in setting their prices to advertisers, do not fully internalize the e¤ect that the advertising volume has on viewers'willingness to pay for watching TV. Due to these shortcomings, inter-…rm coordination can lead to some seemingly counter-intuitive results. We …nd that when products are becoming less di¤erentiated, then TV channels compete more …ercely and joint industry pro…ts is increasing. The reason for this surprising result is that the lack of internalization becomes less serious if the competitive pressure increases. In particular, tougher competition for viewers leads to a lower advertising volume.
In our analysis, we allow at the outset the distributor and each TV channel to bargain over a two-part wholesale contract that consists of a …xed fee and a unit wholesale price. Since the viewer price is increasing in the unit wholesale price, one might expect that the contract could be used to induce …rms to set optimal end-user prices. The problem, however, is that the unit wholesale price a¤ects the 1 For a de…nition of two-sided markets, see Weyl (2010) . Examples, in addition to the TV industry, are other media industries, the payment-card industry, real-estate brokerage, and the computing industry (computer operating systems, software, game consoles etc.). See Wright (2004) for a general discussion of the problems associated with applying a one-sided logic to a two-sided market. Note, however, that he is not discussing the point we are making. 1 relative pro…tability between the two sides of the market, and therefore changes both the viewer price and the advertising price. It follows that a two-part tari¤ does not solve the coordination problems. Indeed, we show that joint pro…ts are higher if the industry can commit to a simple …xed fee rather than a two-part wholesale contract. To see why, note that if a channel receives a higher unit wholesale price from the distributor, it will optimally reduce the ad volume in order to attract a larger audience. But then the rival channels are forced to reduce their ad levels too, and their pro…ts fall. This pro…t e¤ect is not internalized in a non-cooperative equilibrium, so unit wholesale prices -and thus viewer prices -are distorted upwards. Two-part tari¤s consequently lead to ine¢ ciently high prices. Both the industry and the consumers would be better o¤ if the wholesale contracts instead consisted of a simple …xed fee.
The focus on the TV industry is a timely one, since business models in this industry are about to change. The presence of the Internet has made it possible for TV channels to bypass independent distributors and instead sell directly to viewers.
Following up on this technological development, we contrast the market structure with a common distributor on one side of the market with one where the TV stations bypass this distributor. In such a situation TV stations set prices non-cooperatively in both markets. Now, each …rm takes into account the interdependence between the two sides of the market, and thus coordinates its prices (intra-…rm coordination). In other words, a TV station uses both viewer prices and advertising prices in order to account for the externalities involved between its two groups of consumers. On the other hand, there is no longer any inter-…rm coordination of prices on one side of the market, since the distributor has disappeared. We show that if TV stations'products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated in viewers'demand, so that competition for viewers is su¢ ciently lax, then a regime with intra-…rm coordination of prices leads to higher industry pro…t than one with inter-…rm coordination through the distributor.
Early studies of media markets, such as Steiner (1952) , were mostly concerned with how competition for raising advertising revenue a¤ects media plurality. 2 is not studied and therefore the two-sidedness of the TV industry is not taken into account. Bel, et al. (2007) is the only other paper we are aware of that discusses the presence of retailers in a two-sided TV market. 3 They focus on a situation where a …rm is vertically integrated, controlling both the distribution and the program production. They do not compare regimes where either distributors or TV stations set end-user prices, as we do here.
In the next section we present a model of the TV industry. In Section 3 we solve this model for the situation where the distributor sets viewer prices, and in Section 4 we solve it for the situation where a TV station sets both its prices. The outcomes in those situations are compared in Sections 5. In Section 6 we o¤er some concluding remarks.
A model of the TV industry
We consider a setting with two TV stations that earn revenues from advertisers and viewers. The advertising level in the programs provided by TV station i (hereafter The preferences of a representative viewer is given by the following quadratic utility function:
where s 2 [0; 1) measures product di¤erentiation: viewers perceive the TV stations' content as independent if s = 0 and as perfect substitutes as s ! 1.
This formulation of viewer preferences has two realistic features. First, viewers do not choose one TV station to watch, but rather consume content from both TV stations; this is called multihoming and is a feature of consumer behavior common in the TV industry that distinguishes it from many other two-sided markets. Secondly, viewers'total demand across TV stations is not …xed, which allows for viewers to respond to lower prices with an increase in total demand. Neither of these features is present in the Hotelling-line approach to viewer demand, which is widely used in analyses of media markets. 4 Viewers' consumer surplus from watching T V i depends both on the viewer price p i and on the advertising level A i . To capture this dependency, we let the generalized price for watching content on T V i be given by
where > 0 measures viewers' disutility of being interrupted by ads. 5 Consumer 4 The merit of using the particular utility function in (1), which is due to Shubik and Levitan (1980) , is that market size does not vary with s; see Motta (2004) for further discussion. Our qualitative results are invariant to the choice of utility function, though. 5 While advertisers obviously bene…t from the presence of viewers, empirical studies like that of Wilbur (2008) indicate that the typical viewer has a disutility from the presence of advertising.
surplus can thus be written as
We choose the unit size of advertising such that = 1 and derive viewers'demand for each media product by solving
= 0; i = 1; 2, to obtain:
There are a total of n advertisers interested in buying advertising space on the two TV channels. Let A ik denote advertiser k's advertising level on T V i, such that
His gross gain from advertising on T V i is naturally increasing in his advertising level and in the number of viewers exposed to its advertising. We make it simple by assuming that the gross gain equals A ik C i ; where > 0. This implies that the net gain for advertiser k from advertising on TV equals
where r i is the advertising price charged by TV channel i for one unit of advertising.
Simultaneous maximization of (3) with respect to A 1k and A 2k for each k; subject to (2), yields the demand for advertising at TV channel i: We abstract from any costs for the TV channels and the distributor, except for access charges. Joint pro…ts for these …rms are thus equal to the sum of advertising revenue and consumer payment:
We make the following assumption to simplify the analysis.
Assumption 1 (i) = 1; (ii) n = 1. .
A similar e¤ect would come from an increase in the number of advertisers n;
total demand for advertising space goes up, as equation (4) shows. Apart from that, our qualitative results do not hinge on the simpli…cation introduced in Assumption 1.
3 With distributor
As already indicated, our main focus is on situation D, where a distributor buys the rights to transmit the channels'contents. Speci…cally, it signs contracts (f 1 ; F 1 ) and (f 2 ; F 2 ) with the two TV stations; f i is a variable fee that T V i charges the distributor per unit of content a viewer watches, and F i is a …xed fee. The size of these fees are determined at stage 1, and at stage 2 the distributor sets viewer prices and the TV channels set advertising prices.
Pro…ts of the distributor and of T V i are now given, respectively, by:
We start out with stage 2 and solve …rst
response:
Equation (8) shows that dr i dp i < 0. This is essentially because an increase in p i reduces the viewing time at T V i and thus the willingness among advertisers to pay for an ad. We also have dr i dr j < 0. This is because channel j will have less ads if it increases its advertising price, and will thus become more attractive to the viewers.
Thereby channel i becomes relatively less attractive, making it optimal to charge a lower advertising price. Advertising prices are consequently strategic substitutes, in contrast to what is typically the case with prices in one-sided markets. 6 Next, let us consider the distributor's maximization problem. Holding advertising prices …xed, and solving fp 1 ; p 2 g = arg max , we …nd
Viewer prices are naturally increasing in the distributor's marginal costs, so that we have dp i df i > 0. We further see that viewer prices are increasing in the TV stations' 6 This is a mechanism that is present also in other models of media markets, see for example 
7
advertising prices: dp i dr i > 0 and dp i dr j > 0. This is so because the higher the advertising prices, the less ads the TV stations will show, and the more attractive they will be for viewers. Therefore the distributor …nds it optimal to charge higher prices.
Equilibrium prices are, from (8) and (9), as follows:
Symmetric, exogenous wholesale prices
Below we shall endogenize the wholesale prices, but to see the mechanisms as clearly as possible it is useful …rst to …x them at some exogenous values, with
In order to ensure non-negative prices and quantities, we assume
We shall later see that this holds when contract terms are endogenized.
Equations (10) and (11) yield
where we for simplicity have skipped subscripts. We further have
The fact that the advertising volume decreases in f induces the distributor to set a viewer price that increases in f : the higher f is, the less advertising there is on TV, and the more are viewers willing to pay for TV. Additionally, a higher f 7 Note that this holds only when the expression for advertising prices is positive, which requires that variable fees f 1 and f 2 are not too di¤erent, in particular that
8 means an increase in the distributor's marginal cost. This magni…es the positive relationship between p and f further. We therefore have dp df
The distributor chooses viewer prices without taking into consideration that, since a higher such price reduces viewing time, advertising revenue will fall. The TV stations likewise choose advertising levels without taking into consideration that more advertising reduces viewers'willingness to pay for watching TV. These neglections have the important implication that the generalized viewer price, G = p + A = (1 + f ) ; is higher than the one maximizing joint pro…ts: G > G opt = p opt = 1=2; recall the restriction f > 1.
It is now straightforward to verify the following: > 0; dp ds > 0).
The closer substitutes the TV stations'contents, the more …ercely will the stations compete in having few advertising slots (and the higher will the advertising prices be). 9 This explains why dA ds < 0 and dr ds > 0: The lower advertising volume in turn allows the distributor to charge higher viewer prices: dp ds > 0. However, since the generalized price is excessively high (G > G opt ), the distributor increases the monetary price by less than what the reduced advertising volume would allow for.
Thus, the generalized price decreases in s:
The distributor's pro…t is found from equations (6), (13) , and (14):
while each TV station's pro…t is 8 We have 
Joint pro…ts thus equal
We can now show the following: 10 Lemma 2 With distributor. Suppose that wholesale prices are …xed and symmetric ( f 1 = f 2 = f ). Joint industry pro…ts increase in s:
Technically, it is not surprising that joint pro…ts increase in s; since G > G opt and dG ds < 0. It is nonetheless remarkable that stronger competition between the TV stations bene…ts both the industry and consumers (the latter following trivially from the fact that consumer surplus is higher the lower is the generalized viewer price).
Endogenous wholesale prices
At stage 1 the distributor and the TV stations bargain over the wholesale contracts (f 1 ; F 1 ) and (f 2 ; F 2 ). This bargaining is done simultaneously and independently between the distributor and each TV station. Since the two parties in each negotiation bargain over two-part tari¤s, this bargaining will be e¢ cient, in the sense that the distributor and TV station i will agree on that variable fee f i that maximizes their joint pro…ts, taking f j as given. The distributor and T V i thus seek to maximize
Simultaneous maximization of (18) for each i gives rise to a symmetric equilibrium in which the two variable fees are the same and equal to
10 Using (15) and (16) < 0. The reason is that a lower wholesale price tends to make it more pro…table for a TV station to sell ads and for the distributor to reduce the viewer price. However, by inserting for (19) into (13) and (14), we can nonetheless state:
Proposition 1: With distributor. Suppose that f is endogenous.
a) The generalized viewer price monotonically decreases in s, with G > G opt for all s.
b) The advertising level is lower in the neighbourhood of s = 1 than at s = 0:
c) Both the viewer price and the advertising price are higher in the neighbourhood of s = 1 than at s = 0: p s!1 > p s=0 , and r s!1 > r s=0 .
By inserting for (19) into (17) we …nd joint pro…ts. Since the generalized price is ine¢ ciently high, but decreasing in the substitutability between the channels, we …nd, analogously to Lemma 2, that aggregate industry pro…ts are higher the less di¤erentiated are the TV stations'contents:
Proposition 2: With distributor. Suppose that f is endogenous. Joint industry pro…ts increase in s:
The …nding that f D > 0 is somewhat surprising. The fact that G > G opt indicates that the wholesale price should optimally be negative in order to press down the generalized price. It can be veri…ed that this actually is true: if the distributor and the two TV stations could negotiate jointly, then they would set f opt < 0.
The reason why f D nonetheless is positive, is the ine¢ ciency that arises in the negotiations because the parties do not take into account how a change in f i a¤ects pro…ts for T V j: More speci…cally, a higher f i increases the relative pro…tability of the viewer market compared to the advertising market for T V i; making it optimal to reduce its advertising volume (through a higher advertising price). This is negative for TV station j, who consequently responds by reducing its own advertising volume.
Therefore also T V j loses advertising revenue when f i increases.
So f = f opt < 0 is not a Nash equilibrium. If the distributor and T V 1, say, agreed on setting f 1 = f opt , then the distributor and T V 2 would increase their joint pro…t by setting f 2 > f opt : But even if f = f opt is not implementable, we might imagine that the industry is able to commit to using only a …xed fee and not a two-part tari¤ in the wholesale contracts. Putting f = 0 in equation (17) we …nd that aggregate industry pro…t now is equal to
As under a two-part tari¤, the …xed fees (F 1 and F 2 ) will be used to distribute pro…ts according to the parties'bargaining power. Comparing joint pro…ts in this case with what the industry achieves with an arbitrary wholesale price, we …nd 11 11 We have
Proposition 3: With distributor. Joint pro…ts are higher in an equilibrium with a simple …xed-fee wholesale contracts ( f i = 0) than in a Nash equilibrium with two-part wholesale tari¤s ( f i = f D ).
No distributor
Now, let us look at the alternative situation, where the TV channels sell directly to viewers. As argued in the Introduction, this is a scenario that is of increasing relevance as technological developments allow TV stations to use the Internet in order to bypass distributors. This means that the TV stations decide both advertising and viewer prices, and that they do not have to pay any distribution fees to downstream …rms (f i 0; F i 0). The pro…t level of T V i is then simply equal to
Solving @ i @r i = 0 and
= 0, we …nd T V i's best responses to T V j's prices:
Note that advertising prices are strategic substitutes also in this case; bestresponse function (22) is qualitatively similar to the one in the previous case, equation (16) . Equation (23) reveals a new aspect, though: the channels compete in viewer prices when they bypass the distributor, and these prices are strategic complements: dp i dp j > 0.
Solving the system of equations in (22) and (23), we obtain equilibrium prices: r = 1 4 s ; and (24)
where subscripts are disregarded for simplicity.
Equations (2), (4), (24) , and (25) 
From equations (24) through (27) Joint industry pro…ts, called T , are now simply equal to aggregate pro…ts for the TV stations:
A comparison
Let us now compare the performance of the two market structures, with and without a distributor. They behave quite di¤erently, depending on the similarity of the TV stations'contents. This is illustrated in Figure 3 . The left-hand-side panel of the …gure measures industry pro…t, and we see that bypassing the distributor yields highest joint pro…t if and only if s is su¢ ciently low (s < s crit ). To see why, suppose …rst that s = 0: Then each TV channel behaves like a monopolist, and it perfectly balances the externalities across the two sides of the market when the distributor is not there. Thus, individual pro…t maximization coincides with industry optimum. This is not the case when the distributor is there: now the generalized price -as noted above -will be too high, since di¤erent …rms set prices on the two sides of the market. The problem with the situation without a distributor is the lack of inter-…rm price coordination. Competition between the TV channels will press down viewer prices, and more so the better substitutes the viewers perceive the channels'contents to be.
Indeed, as s approaches 1, any attempt to charge the viewers for watching TV will induce the rival to undercut in a Bertrand manner. The same is not true in the other case, when the distributor is present. Now the distributor internalizes price e¤ects, taking into account that a lower p 1 will reduce the revenue it can raise from T V 2, and vice versa. The advantage for the industry of internalizing these competitive externalities is greater than the disadvantage of not being able to internalize the two-sidedness of the market (the externalities between advertisers and viewers) if s > s crit . In other words, when competition for viewers is su¢ ciently strong, the need for intra-…rm price coordination is dominated by the need for inter-…rm price coordination.
From these re ‡ections it also follows that the relative importance of viewer payments, = pC pC+rA , necessarily must be lower without a distributor than with one, if s is above a critical value. In the right-hand-side panel of Figure 3 TV channels, a market structure where di¤erent …rms set prices on the two sides of the market can hardly be more e¢ cient than one where the two-sidedness is fully internalized if we consider a TV channel that o¤ers unique content (which in our context should be interpreted as s being close to zero). Likewise, it is di¢ cult to see how channels with non-unique content (high s) should be able to raise higher pro…ts if they compete head-to-head than if they delegate the prricing decision to a …rm that internalizes the competitive externalities on the viewer side of the market.
Concluding remarks
Our analysis illustrates the challenge …rms face when they try to coordinate prices in a two-sided market. It might seem appropriate to let an independent distributor set viewer prices in order to reduce competition between TV channels in the viewer market. This could lead to a cartel-like outcome in a one-sided market, but not in a two-sided market. The problem is that inter-…rm price coordination on just one side of the market prevents intra-…rm price coordination. In this paper paper we show that this might lead to ine¢ ciently high generalized prices, and possibly more so if the wholesale contracts between a distributor and a TV channel consist of a two-part tari¤ rather than a simple …xed fee.
An alternative could be to combine an independent distributor that coordinates viewer prices with other ways to take the two-sidedness into account. For example, the distributors' payment to the TV channels could depend on the TV channels' advertising revenues. However, this does not seem to be a common business model, at least not in the UK or Scandinavia. 12 An interesting research question is why this is so; could it for instance be due to contractual problems that arise when each distributor bargains with a large number of TV channels?
Since the generalized viewer prices tends to be too high when the distributor sets viewer prices, one might imagine that the coordination problem could be overcome by employing resale price maintenance (RPM), where the TV stations set a maximum price that the distributor can charge from the viewers. 13 But if RPM is enforced and viewer prices are reduced, this would in turn change the the rivalry between the TV channels in the advertising market. In that respect the consequences of RPM is more complex in a two-sided than in a corresponding one-sided market.
We leave this issue for future research.
